Tag Archives: Reasonable Suspicion

Santos v. State

Posted on by
Reply

ANTHONY SANTOS v. STATE OF MARYLAND
Court of Special Appeals, Beachley, Oct. 26, 2016,
Investigative “Terry” Stop – During car stop for a traffic violation, reasonable suspicion existed to detain the driver where he was nervous, sweating, and lied to officers about stopping and meeting with another individual. Moreover, a warrant check on the driver came back with two possible warrants, and the officers had developed probable cause before the warrant check was finalized.
Continue reading →

Sellman v. State

Posted on by
Reply

DONZEL SELLMAN v. STATE OF MARYLAND
Court of Appeals, Greene, August 24, 2016,
Frisk – Nervousness, presence in a high crime area, conflicting stories, and questionable identity provided did not amount to reasonable suspicion that the suspect was armed and dangerous. Frisk was illegal.

(Dissent – Watts, joined by Battaglia – would find RAS for frisk based on totality of circumstances, would credit arresting officer as did fact finder)
Continue reading →

Chase v. State

Posted on by
Reply

IRA CHASE v. STATE OF MARYLAND
Court of Appeals, Battaglia, August 19, 2016,
Terry – Keeping a suspect in handcuffs for a short period of time after they have been frisked does not automatically transform a Terry stop into an arrest where there is still a reasonable belief that the suspect may have a weapon inside a nearby vehicle.

Continue reading →

Jones v. Chandrasuwan

Posted on by
Reply

STANLEY JONES v. LANNA CHANDRASUWAN; BRIAN HOLBROOK
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Floyd, Apr. 28, 2016,
Probation Arrest – “probation officers must have reasonable suspicion before seeking the arrest of a probationer for allegedly violating conditions of his probation”

Continue reading →

United States v. Shaquille Robinson

Posted on by
Reply

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. SHAQUILLE MONTEL ROBINSON
US Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, Harris, Filed Feb. 23, 2016,
VACATED, EN BANC – opinion by Niemeyer

Seizure – “Because West Virginia authorizes the public carrying of weapons, reasonable suspicion that [an individual] was armed did not by itself justify a Terry frisk”

(Dissent by Niemeyer – 1) The standard is armed and THUS dangerous, 2) the possibility of a valid firearm license did not acceptably minimize the danger to officers, and 3) RAS is not the negation of all possible innocent conduct)
Continue reading →